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Carbon Cultures: Technology Planning for 
Energy and Climate in the US and EU
Mads Dahl Gjefsen
Emerging technologies are not simply pursued out of economic interests, but also 
on the basis of assumptions about the societies and publics that technologies will 
serve. This paper compares how carbon dioxide capture and storage – a technology 
for sustainable energy generation – has been supported in the United States and 
European Union over the last decade. Distinct land ownership laws and market 
structures have helped legitimate diff erent groups of actors as stakeholders in the 
technology, and CO2 has been redefi ned in relation to diff erent policy narratives and 
legal ontologies in the two sites. Climate change mitigation might appear to depend 
on international cooperation founded on a shared epistemic basis. However, this 
article suggests that mitigation options should not simply be assessed as functions of 
technical qualities, but also be understood in relation to how political actors articulate 
and pursue the societal implications of technological futures. 
Keywords: Climate change, comparative policy, co-production
Introduction
Carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS) is 
a set of technologies aimed at capturing CO2 
emitted from large stationary sources, such 
as power plants burning fossil fuels, and 
transporting it for safe, permanent storage 
in geological formations. Th e concept of 
CO2 storage is rooted in 1970s “enhanced 
oil recovery” where CO2 was injected into 
oil fi elds to manipulate pressure  – still 
widely practiced in the US. CCS could curb 
emissions from power plants running on 
coal, which is the world’s largest source 
of energy and also one of the largest 
anthropogenic sources of CO2 emissions. 
CCS fi gures prominently in overviews of 
the technologies that are needed in order to 
meet the international target of limiting the 
global temperature increase to 2 °C above 
pre-industrial levels (Pacala & Socolow, 
2004; IPCC, 2005; MIT, 2007; Stern, 2007 
IEA, 2009). Th e technology has seen a 
dramatic increase in political attention 
and support in many countries over the 
last decade, motivated in part by eff orts to 
jointly address climate change and energy 
demands (Langhelle & Meadowcroft, 
2009; Markusson et al., 2012). Political 
enthusiasm aside, however, environmental 
organizations have been divided on 
questions about the safety and desirability 
of CCS (Anderson & Chiavari, 2009), and 
CCS developers have voiced concerns about 
a slow speed of actual progress (Shackley 
& Evar, 2012). Th e challenges are many 
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and varied. Obstacles and uncertainties are 
said to include issues of cost, policy and 
regulation, technology development and 
public support (Markusson et al., 2011; 
Nykvist, 2013; Stigson et al., 2012). Distinct 
barriers are frequently listed in technology 
assessments by government and industry 
actors, calling for climate change legislation 
(such as the Norwegian tax on off shore 
CO2 emissions which in 1996 motivated oil 
company Statoil to begin separating CO2 
from natural gas and inject it below the 
seabed), and voicing concerns that “[p]ublic 
understanding of CCS remains low” (the 
apparent assumption being that increased 
understanding would strengthen public 
support for the technology) (Global CCS 
Institute, 2012: 2-3). 
Th e prevalence of compartmentalized 
”obstacles” and ”barriers”, both within 
academic literature on CCS and amongst 
developers of the technology, can be usefully 
supplemented by Science and Technology 
Studies (STS) approaches to the integrated 
study of narratives, materialities and 
institutional practices around technological 
development (for notable examples, see 
Markusson et al., 2012; Narita, 2010; Pollak 
et al., 2011). STS interpretations might shed 
light on how some concerns about CCS 
come to be more relevant in certain contexts 
rather than others, and, conversely, how 
diff erent actors articulate the “purpose” of 
CCS and render it meaningful as worthy 
of pursuit. Stigson and colleagues argue 
that evaluating the relative importance of 
diff erent “obstacles” to CCS in diff erent 
contexts could have important policy 
implications (Stigson et al., 2012: 615). But 
understanding how CCS is presented (and 
contested) as a political object could give 
theoretical insights as well. Questioning 
claims about its inherent meanings might 
not only improve our understanding of 
the relationships between societal and 
technological change, but could also help 
us ask productive questions about how 
climate change and other seemingly global 
concerns are formulated as grounds for 
action in diff erent contexts.
Here I ask what has characterized the 
engagement with CCS in the United States 
(US) and the European Union (EU), two 
political contexts where the technology 
has gained particular prominence over the 
previous decade. Th e paper is explorative 
and takes a comparative approach in order 
to examine how ideas about CCS have 
become established in relation to legal, 
institutional and other societal factors, 
rather than as direct functions of predefi ned 
technological characteristics. I do not aim to 
assess the technical performance of CCS or 
make judgements about its relative success, 
but concentrate instead on identifying how 
CCS has become associated with broader 
societal trends and political pursuits, 
subjected to diff erent regulatory traditions, 
and gained signifi cance to diff erent groups 
of stakeholders.
In what follows, I describe my theoretical 
and methodological approach and position 
the paper in relation to existing literature 
on the political and social dimensions of 
CCS. I then go on to outline and compare 
the societal and political ambitions CCS 
has increasingly become associated with in 
the US and EU. I argue that the technology 
has become enrolled in distinct forms 
of federalism, helping the US launch 
technology-focused international climate 
change mitigation eff orts as an alternative 
to imposing domestic emissions regulation 
on the one hand, and underwriting a 
project of European integration, partly 
through the institutionalization of 
stakeholder participation and the design 
of funding schemes on the other. I argue 
that comparison helps identify diff erences 
with important implications for the cross-
national sharing of expertise and learning 
that CCS developers themselves present as 
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public awareness and attitudes (Ashworth 
et al., 2012; Huijts et al., 2007; Oltra et 
al., 2010; Upham & Roberts, 2011). Th ese 
perception-oriented approaches have 
delivered rich accounts of a broad range 
of public responses both to individual CCS 
projects and to more abstract notions of 
the desirability of CCS as a climate change 
mitigation strategy. Th ey tell us, for instance, 
that publics are generally less aware of 
CCS than they are of renewable energy 
technologies, and that concerns about CCS 
include fears of CO2 leaking from reservoirs 
or that CO2 will explode, concerns about 
local projects negatively aff ecting property 
values, or that CCS diverts funding away 
from renewable energy. However, these 
approaches have not generally sought to 
connect their observations with trends in 
political narratives and support-structures. 
Th ese two strands of research can be 
usefully supplemented by STS approaches 
to technological change as something that 
both enables and remakes constellations of 
agency and possibility, and which cuts across 
boundaries between the technical, social 
and political (Bijker et al., 1987; Winner, 
1988; Wynne, 1988). Placed at the interface 
between politically charged concerns 
about energy security and environmental 
protection, and planned according 
to prediction-based epistemologies 
about technological development and 
profi tability trajectories, CCS is not simply 
adapted to national needs and interests 
in a straightforward manner. Instead, the 
envisaged ability of CCS to address issues 
of nature management is intimately linked 
with negotiations about which social and 
political aims should be pursued in the 
fi rst place, by which means, and to whose 
benefi t. Th us, the making of the technology 
also involves rearrangements of societal 
structures – what Jasanoff  (2004) refers to 
as the co-production of natural and social 
order. Th ese processes are particularly 
a key factor for the future of the technology 
(Global CCS Institute, 2012: 3), and that 
theoretical resources from STS can help 
unpack the ways in which assumedly 
unifi ed global concerns are addressed by 
political actors.
Literature and Methods
Th is article seeks to complement two 
largely distinct strands of research on the 
social and political dimensions of CCS. Th e 
fi rst strand deals with the measurement of 
political support for CCS, and is represented 
largely by cross-national comparative 
research (Bäckstrand et al., 2011; de 
Coninck & Bäckstrand, 2011; Meadowcroft 
& Langhelle, 2009; Tjernshaugen, 2008). As 
Shackley (2012) points out, this literature 
often explains political support for CCS 
with reference to the “interest model” 
of politics, where economic rationality 
suggests that national governments would 
seek to maintain cheap and abundant 
fossil fuel energy supplies in a carbon 
constrained future. Th is model might 
explain the more recent stagnation of CCS 
eff orts with reference to factors such as the 
continued high costs of the technology, 
and the emergence of alternative energy 
production strategies based on less CO2-
intensive energy production, such as that 
currently witnessed in what reporters refers 
to as the “shale gas revolution” of the United 
States (Th e Economist, 2012). While useful 
for explaining why political entities initiate 
or suspend support for CCS, such research 
rarely seeks to unpack how promotion or 
opposition to the technology takes shape 
within diff erent contexts. 
A second strand of research consists 
of a diverse body of literature on public 
perception and engagement with CCS. It 
includes single case studies (Feenstra et al., 
2010), risk-perception studies (Singleton 
et al., 2009), and comparative studies of 
Mads Dahl Gjefsen
Science & Technology Studies 3/2013
66
identifi able through comparison on the level 
of political units, including nation-states, 
international organizations and sectorial 
agencies, where pre-existing institutions 
and processes for managing nature through 
policy and regulation infl uence how 
technologies are debated and pursued 
(Ezrahi, 1990; Jasanoff , 2004, 2005; Jasanoff  
& Kim, 2009; Mukerji, 1989). Th is does not 
mean that such units should be seen as 
static or deterministic, but rather that their 
observable infl uence on technological 
trajectories off ers a productive starting 
point for analysis of how technologies are 
interpreted as being in the public interest. 
Comparing how diff erent political actors 
defi ne and pursue technological visions 
can help us understand the range of ways 
that technological risks, uncertainties and 
possibilities are understood and acted 
upon, when and under what conditions 
they become relevant, and for whom. Th is 
in turn provides a basis for understanding 
public responses and concerns as reactions 
to changes in the broad range of societal 
structures that are implicated in and 
aff ected by technological change, rather 
than as isolated reactions to predefi ned and 
inherent technological qualities.
Th e US and the EU are useful units of 
comparison when it comes to CCS since 
both have put signifi cant emphasis on the 
technology in their federal-level approaches 
to energy and climate change mitigation over 
the previous decade. New public institutions 
and private market actors have emerged 
in response to federal-level developments 
in both places, infl uenced in part by the 
parallel eff orts of both the US and the EU to 
supplement existing state and member state 
legislation with federal regulation as a way 
to incentivise private actor investments in 
the technology. Th ere have been persisting 
diff erences in how the prospects of CCS – 
encompassing scepticism as well as support 
– have been formulated in relation to federal 
policy priorities, and in how these priorities 
have been infl uenced by factors at the level 
of regions and constituent (member) states. 
Th ese diff erences allow us to question 
the inherency of categorized qualities, 
possibilities and uncertainties around CCS. 
Despite their diff erent political formats, 
the supranational EU and US nation state 
– the world’s largest fi nancial actors – are 
a frequent topic of comparison on issues 
of regulatory science and environmental 
governance (Jasanoff , 2005; Smith, 2012; 
Vig & Faure, 2004; Vogel, 2012). While 
acknowledging their distinctiveness and 
heterogeneity, I compare the two polities 
here with a view towards the diff erent 
ways in which federal-level ambitions have 
aff ected pursuits of CCS in two places. 
As a yet unrealized object of political 
support, CCS is funded and debated 
with reference to what it might become, 
and beliefs regarding its future role not 
only refl ect isolated assumptions about 
the technology itself, but also imply 
expectations about the kind of society it 
will operate in. Articulations of the purpose 
of technological pursuits can be read as 
expressions of sociotechnical imaginaries 
(Jasanoff  & Kim, 2009), in that they are not 
simply rationalistic assessments of technical 
capabilities, but also give insights into 
how broader societal ambitions aff ect how 
technologies are interpreted as political 
objects. Political narratives, regulatory 
change and new institutions designed 
to promote CCS, are understood here as 
instruments of co-production (Jasanoff , 
2004: 39-43), where expectations about how 
technical artefacts will interact with and 
support societal structures are stabilized, 
and publics are implicated or excluded as 
stakeholders in technological change. 
Th e paper draws on a combination of 
qualitative, comparative methods, and 
historical case study approaches. I limit my 
investigation to the previous decade, which 
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has seen political support of CCS intensify 
in both places (Langhelle & Meadowcroft, 
2009). Data collection took place between 
October 2011 and October 2012. Building on 
existing research on the institutional make 
up of the international CCS community 
(Stephens et al., 2011; Stephens & Liu, 2012), 
I collected offi  cial statements, reports, 
policy recommendations and technology 
assessments from government and industry 
bodies, as well as from non-governmental 
organizations and environmental groups 
playing prominent roles in the politics and 
policy of CCS in the two political settings. 
I also conducted archival research with 
the Carbon Sequestration Leadership 
Forum and the Zero Emissions Platform, 
two institutions whose were founded as 
part of the federal-level pursuit of CCS by 
the US and EU respectively. Th e collection 
of materials was to some extent informed 
by informal reviews of media coverage 
and conversations with professionals from 
industry, research, government agencies, 
and environmental organizations at a 
number of professional meetings and 
conferences related to the technology. In 
addition to written sources, I conducted 
a series of 23 semi-structured interviews1 
with representatives of several such 
organizations. Additional perspectives on 
CCS were collected in the form of reports and 
position papers from major environmental 
organizations known to be sceptical of or 
opposed to the technology, but I refrained 
from interviewing representatives from 
these organizations, as my primary focus 
was on comparing the articulation of offi  cial 
political support in the two contexts.
US: CCS as Economical Pathway 
to Environmental Protection
Jasanoff  and Kim argue that large-scale 
technological pursuits allow states to present 
themselves as responsible regulators and 
protectors of the public interest (Jasanoff  & 
Kim, 2009: 121). Th e language with which 
then-president George W. Bush announced 
his Clear Skies and Global Climate Change 
Initiatives indicates how CCS would be 
central to US policy justifi cations both 
domestically and internationally over the 
following decade: 
[E]conomic growth is key to environ-
mental progress, because it is growth 
that provides the resources for invest-
ment in clean technologies. [My] 
approach will harness the power of 
markets, the creativity of entrepre-
neurs, and draw upon the best scientifi c 
research. And it will make possible a 
new partnership with the developing 
world to meet our common environ-
mental and economic goals. (White 
House Offi  ce of the Press Secretary, 
2002)
“Clean technologies” in this context referred 
specifi cally to CCS – a central component in 
the above policy packages – whose promise of 
emissions-free fossil fuel power generation 
would come to support increasingly 
common US narratives around “clean 
coal”. Bush’s climate policies emphasised 
market mechanisms and technological 
development as alternatives to government 
regulation in the form of mandatory cuts 
in greenhouse gas emissions (Stephens, 
2009). Th e US had funded research on 
CCS since the 1990s, intensifi ed with the 
Department of Energy’s establishment of a 
designated Carbon Sequestration Program 
in 1997 (de Coninck, 2008; Pollak et al., 
2011). Th e early 2000s saw a marked strong 
and decisive move on the level of national 
policy towards CCS as a response to linked 
concerns in the areas of energy production 
and climate change mitigation. As Stephens 
notes, energy politics was an important 
motivator; the US had a historical reliance 
Science & Technology Studies 3/2013
68
on cheap energy, supplied by imported oil 
and domestic coal. Maintaining the supply 
was a political priority, and utilization 
of domestic coal resources could cure 
the nation’s “addiction” to foreign oil 
(Stephens, 2009: 25). By deferring to the 
prospects of market-driven technological 
development, the US state was thus able 
to avoid direct interference with industry 
through regulation, and sidestep the issue 
of imposing restrictive measures for cutting 
CO2 emissions.
On the international stage, the US 
portrayed CCS as an alternative pathway 
to international cooperation on climate 
change mitigation. Th e country had received 
international criticism for not ratifying the 
Kyoto Treaty of 1997, which set nation-
specifi c targets for cuts in greenhouse gas 
emissions. In 2003 the US established the 
ministerial-level Carbon Sequestration 
Leadership Forum (CSLF), whose purpose 
was to promote CCS on the global arena 
and whose members included governments 
already pushing for CCS development in 
their home countries. In 2005 the US led 
the formation of a second alliance, the Asia-
Pacifi c Partnership on Clean Development 
& Climate (APP), a partnership of some of 
the world’s highest emitters of CO2, which 
presented the development of CCS as one of 
its most central objectives. Th e APP’s Charter 
stated that it sought to “complement but not 
replace the Kyoto Protocol” (APP, 2007). 
On the US domestic front, however, the US’ 
involvement in these multinational eff orts 
were presented as promoting alternatives to 
the mandatory emissions cuts prescribed by 
the Kyoto Protocol:
Rather than making drastic reduc-
tions in greenhouse gas emissions 
that would put millions of Americans 
out of work and undermine our abil-
ity to make long-term investments in 
clean energy -- as the Kyoto Protocol 
would have required -- the President’s 
growth-based approach will accelerate 
the development of new technologies 
and encourage partnerships on cli-
mate change issues with the developing 
world. (White House Offi  ce of the Press 
Secretary, 2002)
Federal-level US eff orts to promote 
CCS around this time appears to have 
allowed authorities represent themselves 
as protectors of the “public interest” 
both internationally and domestically. 
Leadership in international collaboration 
around CCS built alliances around a 
technology-oriented approach to climate 
change mitigation that contrasted with the 
Kyoto Protocol’s regulation-based approach. 
Th e contrast was emphasized when the 
Bush administration’ presented its role 
in these alliances to domestic audiences, 
where greenhouse gas emission reductions 
were presented as a good insofar as they did 
not come at the expense of American jobs. 
Domestically, US support for CCS 
appears to be closely linked with questions 
about regional and local growth. 2003 saw 
the establishment of a nationwide network 
on public and private organizations 
involved in CCS through the Department 
of Energy’s Regional Carbon Sequestration 
Partnerships, which assessed the potential 
for CCS deployment in diff erent US regions 
(US Department of Energy, 2012). Alongside 
this nationwide mobilization, President 
Bush announced plans for the CCS 
demonstration project FutureGen, which 
would become known as the cornerstone 
of his administration’s climate change 
program. Th e US Department of Energy 
and a consortium of electricity producers 
and utility companies aimed to build the 
world’s fi rst coal-fi red power plant with 
integrated CO2 capture and storage. Th e 
project site was chosen through a national 
competition. Selection criteria included 
a strong emphasis on public support, in 
a process which attracted national media 
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attention as 12 communities from 7 states 
put in their bids to become the site of a 
major technological testing-ground. In 
2007 the small township of Mattoon, Illinois 
was selected to host the project. Its citizens 
had supported the project primarily for the 
prospects of local job creation, economic 
development and the prestige of hosting an 
important technological project (Ashworth 
et al., 2012; WRI, 2010: 43-45). 
Despite initial optimism, the FutureGen 
project quickly ran into fi nancial challenges 
and was later redesigned and moved to a 
diff erent location. Regardless, its emphasis 
on local support illustrates a broader US 
trend where CCS developers consider 
the support from local publics to be an 
important factor for the fate of individual 
projects. Th is is particularly the case in 
those states where public hearings are 
an integral part of the project permitting 
process. In 2009 the Regional Carbon 
Sequestration Partnerships released best 
practices for community engagement and 
encouraged developers to treat local publics 
as autonomous individuals who were 
able to formulate their own, independent 
views about the stakes involved in locating 
CCS projects near their community. Th e 
Partnerships stressed that engagement 
should focus on identifying local “values 
and concerns ... as well as the perceived 
benefi ts” of CCS projects, and warned 
that underestimating the importance of 
public engagement “can contribute to 
delays, increased costs, and community 
ill will” (NETL, 2012: 9-14). Similar points 
were stressed in guidelines on community 
engagement from the World Resources 
Institute (WRI, 2010). 
In interviews, environmental organization 
representatives and policy offi  cials who had 
helped produce such guidelines indicated 
that local expectations for CCS appeared to 
be less connected with its climate change 
mitigation properties than with the potential 
of new projects to stimulate local economic 
growth and job creation. I was also told 
that local opposition to CCS were often 
grounded in fears of decreasing property 
values. One environmental representative 
stated that their organization had all but 
given up on establishing support for CCS 
by referring to its climate change mitigation 
potential, and that their current strategy 
foregrounded the economic benefi ts of the 
technology. In a separate interview, I was 
told that an emphasis on the climate change 
benefi ts of CCS had actually fostered public 
opposition in regions of the US where 
disbelief in anthropocentric climate change 
was prevalent. In interviews, it appeared 
that the national level emphasis on CCS as a 
pathway to economic growth corresponded 
with a similar focus around individual 
projects, where local communities displayed 
particular receptiveness to arguments 
stressing the economic benefi ts of CCS 
projects. Local concerns seemed to both be 
structured by and reinforcing of framings 
of CCS as having both environmental and 
economic consequences, co-producing 
expectations of technological control of 
CO2 emissions along with expectations 
about who would benefi t from the new 
technology. 
Th ese responses are not predefi ned 
or “natural” responses to the technical 
qualities of CCS, but instead take shape 
in relation to factors such as regional 
scepticism about the existence of climate 
change. Informants’ perceived need to 
focus on the local economic implications 
of CCS in public engagement eff orts, and to 
deemphasize the climate change mitigation 
potential of the technology, thus correspond 
with the aforementioned political narratives 
around CCS as an economical as well as 
an environmental technology. Another 
important factor here, which is directly 
comparable to the EU context, can be found 
in the area of property law.
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Local public stakes in CCS frequently 
appear to be formulated in relation to US 
land ownership rights. US developers are 
obliged to acquire use rights to the geological 
formations in which CO2 will be stored. Even 
though subsurface property rights and the 
relationship between land ownership and 
control over water and mineral rights vary 
signifi cantly among the US states (Wilson & 
Gibbons, 2007: 351), the use rights relevant 
to CO2 storage are generally held by private 
landowners. As a result, new businesses 
specializing in navigating regulations and 
leasing use rights have emerged over the 
last decade. One such company markets 
their activity as enabling local land owners 
to make informed decisions: “we strive to 
make the landowners – primarily farmers 
and ranchers – a part of our projects by 
educating and compensating them for 
the rights to manage CO2 in their pore 
space” (C12 Energy, 2012). Pre-existing 
legal commitments to the governance of 
land ownership appears to have not only 
implicated these citizen-groups as potential 
economic stakeholders in CCS. It also seems 
to have stimulated the emergence of a 
distinct market-driven regime for enrolling 
citizen stakeholders through the delivery 
of information, with the implication that 
autonomous judgement can then be 
exercised in the face of the new possibilities 
off ered by CO2 storage.
Th e interpretative fl exibility of CCS has 
allowed unlikely partners to ally in support 
of the yet undeveloped technology (Pinch 
& Bijker, 1984). Pollak and colleagues 
(2011) have demonstrated that pre-existing 
economic interests and regulatory regimes 
for enhanced oil recovery in the US have 
fostered alliances between environmental 
organizations and the politically powerful 
US energy industry. Th ese allies have 
diff erent ambitions when it comes to policy 
and regulation. Th e climate coalition favours 
policy regimes that encourage geological 
storage of CO2 for climate change mitigation, 
while the energy industry generally pursues 
CCS on the basis of expectations that 
regulation of CO2 emissions is imminent 
(Pollak et al., 2011). Th ese expectations 
were strengthened towards the end of 
President Bush’s second term, amid signals 
of an emerging bipartisan consensus in the 
US Congress on the need for climate change 
legislation. In May 2007, a Supreme Court 
decision found that greenhouse gases could 
be considered air pollutants, and thus fall 
under the jurisdiction of the Environmental 
Protection Agency under the Clean Air Act 
(Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection 
Agency, 2007). Th e landmark decision 
opened up the possibility of increased 
regulation of CO2. Earlier that year, the 
Global Warming Pollution Reduction Act, 
which would have increased public funding 
for research and development of CCS, had 
been proposed with support from most 
leading environmental groups (notably 
including Greenpeace, which in Europe 
has been among the most outspoken 
opponents to CCS). However, it did not get 
past a Senate Committee. Two years later 
the American Clean Energy and Security Act 
of 2009, which would have incentivized CCS 
development by imposing an emissions 
trading system in the US, was defeated in 
the Senate. 
What environmentalists saw as major 
legislative setbacks in 2009 reverberated 
among CCS proponents as well. Th e 
weakened prospects for imminent CO2 
emission cuts in the US were seen by 
several informants as having jeopardized 
the willingness of industry to invest in 
CCS development, as a result forcing CCS 
advocates to restate the “business case” 
for CCS. Several interviewees representing 
environmental organizations stated that 
in addition to framing their support for 
CCS in economic terms they now also 
deemed it necessary to actively promote 
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enhanced oil recovery. Th eir rationale was 
that regulatory support for enhanced oil 
recovery could stimulate industry research 
and bring down the cost of CO2 capture. 
Th e reorientation of advocacy eff orts thus 
reclassifi ed CO2 as well, promoting it as a 
potentially valuable industrial commodity 
rather than as an environmental hazard in 
need of containment.
Th e same trend is visible in a 
reformulation of government support after 
2009. In interviews policy offi  cials described 
how the US Department of Energy 
abandoned the label CCS and adopted 
the abbreviation CCUS, carbon capture, 
utilization and storage, shifting its focus 
towards industrial uses of CO2 as a way of 
stimulating research on CO2 capture. On 
the international stage, internal documents 
show how the US shifted the focus of 
the CSLF by instituting a CO2 utilization 
taskforce and amending the Forum charter 
to include utilization as a Forum priority 
(CSLF, 2012: 1–2). In his opening remarks to 
the 2012 Department of Energy-sponsored 
annual meeting on CCS, which that year 
was renamed the Annual Carbon Capture, 
Utilization and Sequestration Conference, 
Assistant Secretary of Fossil Energy Chuck 
McConnell explained the need for a new 
focus: “We have to look at enhanced oil 
recovery as a way to make [CO2 storage] 
happen” (ExchangeMonitor, 2012). 
While proposals for market-disruptive 
greenhouse gas control measures were 
rejected, then, the view that CCS could 
off er a pathway to economic growth 
continued to infl uence both US discourse 
and policy on the technology. Th is has been 
a recurring theme both in domestic federal 
level policy discourse and in attempts at 
infl uencing international climate change 
mitigation eff orts over the past decade. 
As the prospects of imminent mandatory 
domestic cuts in CO2 emissions became 
less likely after the failure of new legislation, 
supporters of CCS have become even more 
dependent on identifying possible synergies 
with market-driven industrial uses of CO2. 
Alongside these changes, the substance 
that CCS is designed to control in the fi rst 
place has straddled diff erent ontological 
systems within US political narratives, as 
legal classifi cations and offi  cial agency 
language has classifi ed CO2 either as an 
environmental hazard or as a commodity in 
search of possible market applications.
EU: CCS as Sustainable Pathway 
to Europeanization
As with the US, the EU’s engagement with 
CCS can be read in relation to its relationship 
with the Kyoto Protocol. However, the 
EU has attempted to combine support of 
CCS with a regulation-based approach to 
climate change mitigation, rather than to 
pursue the technology as an independent 
alternative to regulation in its own right. 
Like the US, the EU as a whole is dependent 
on imported energy, and its pursuit of CCS 
over the previous decade is closely linked 
with its recognition of maintaining energy 
supplies as a central federal-level concern 
(Natorsky and Herranz Surralés, 2008). Th e 
establishment over the last decade of EU-
wide regulation of CO2 emissions, as well 
as a common market for carbon emission 
allowances and attempts to promote the 
interconnection of energy networks, have 
embedded the pursuit of CCS in broader 
processes of European integration. 
Th e EU sporadically funded CCS research 
during the 1990s. However, the technology 
fi rst appeared on the EU’s political agenda 
in 2005 as the European Commission 
discussed how the EU could meet the climate 
change mitigation targets set down in the 
Kyoto Protocol (which all member countries 
had transposed into national legislation 
by 2002) (EC, 2005). Th e Commission 
emphasized the need to take advantage of 
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synergies between policy areas in order to 
“[minimize] the cost of abatement policies” 
(EC, 2005: 3) and recommended CCS as a 
key priority for EU climate policy. Th e EU’s 
commitment to the Kyoto Protocol would 
thus have a strong impact on the ways that 
CCS became incorporated in visions for a 
future, sustainable and energy independent 
Europe. 
As Claes and Frisvold (2009) argue, 
the EU took on a leadership role in 
international climate change mitigation 
eff orts partly to justify the EU project of 
integration following its 2004 expansion 
and the 2005 rejection of attempts to create 
a consolidated EU constitution. President 
of the European Commission, José Manuel 
Barroso had identifi ed the linkages between 
energy and climate change as an area where 
the EU could demonstrate decisive and 
orchestrated action, and the Commission 
composed a comprehensive Climate and 
Energy Package. CCS was soon identifi ed 
as a potential technological bridge between 
these policy domains. With backing from 
the European Council, the Commission 
was charged with establishing a legal 
framework for CCS and with drafting a 
policy to support the establishment of up to 
12 CCS demonstration projects by 2015 in 
what was intended to be the EU’s fl agship 
CCS programme (European Council, 2007). 
However, federal-level policies did not 
necessarily refl ect homogenous interests 
in CCS across the Union. As Fischer (2012: 
87-88) points out, EU support of CCS 
came after signifi cant pressure from the 
United Kingdom and the Netherlands to 
make CCS a EU priority, as CCS was met 
with reluctance from nuclear-dependent 
France and opposition from Southern 
European member states where geological 
characteristics were less suited for geological 
CO2 storage. 
Th e establishment of CCS as an object 
of EU-level support did not simply depend 
on political horse-trading among member 
states, but also on establishing order among 
the various industry and civil society forces 
with stakes in the technology. Following 
calls for increased integration of European 
research eff orts by the European Council, 
new institutions called European Technology 
Platforms (ETPs) had been established 
as “industry-led stakeholder forums with 
the aim of defi ning medium to long-term 
research and technological objectives and 
developing roadmaps to achieve them” 
(EC, 2011). One of the fi rst such platforms 
was the Zero Emission Fossil Fuel Power 
Plants Technology Platform ZEP), founded 
in 2005 to support the growing interest in 
CCS as a EU-level concern. While the fi rst 
institutional manifestations of US pursuits 
of CCS had been on the international stage, 
one of the fi rst institutional developments to 
come out of EU federal-level interest in CCS 
was thus designed to establish a common 
vision for how the technology could serve a 
shared, European community. Alongside its 
formal obligation as research advisor to the 
European Commission, this platform would 
soon seek to establish itself as the central 
EU-level public authority and stakeholder 
representative on CCS, and its activities are 
therefore given particular emphasis here. 
Th e platform’s membership included 
equipment suppliers, utility companies and 
companies in the oil and gas sector, as well as 
research communities and environmental 
non-governmental organizations – groups 
that have often disagreed on the aims and 
means by which CCS should be pursued in 
the EU (Claes & Frisvold, 2009: 224). Th e ETP 
framework required these actors to agree 
on common recommendations to the EC, 
which would thereby receive joint research 
advice from a single body. ZEP exemplifi ed 
the potential of boundary organizations to 
dually seek representational legitimacy and 
epistemic authority (Guston, 2001). While 
research recommendations are fronted 
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by industry experts, meeting minutes 
show ZEP strategically foregrounding its 
environmental organization members in 
public communication in an eff ort to inspire 
public trust (ZEP, 2007). While the inclusion 
of environmental organizations was not in 
itself extraordinary for ETPs, interviewees 
stated that the Commission had made 
the unprecedented move of requiring 
their involvement a condition for ZEP’s 
establishment, as a way of improving the 
credibility of a platform primarily consisting 
of members from fossil fuel intensive 
industries. Nonetheless, the formation of 
ZEP would set limits on who would get 
to have the sanctioned attention of the 
European Commission, as environmental 
organizations Greenpeace and WWF, both 
of whom have voiced concerns that funding 
for CCS might come at the expense of 
renewable energy technology investments 
(see especially Greenpeace International, 
2008), eventually chose to withdraw rather 
than being associated with ZEP’s positions 
(ZEP, 2006a: 2). Th e European Commission’s 
legitimation of stakeholders representing 
the breadth of interests in CCS through 
ZEP served to dually underwrite the pursuit 
of the technology as a European venture, 
and to set limits on who would speak for 
the technology and its implications. In 
this respect the platform appears to have 
functioned as a deliberative forum for 
European industry experts in a process 
which also set limits on civic representation 
and justifi ed “the inclusion or exclusion 
of citizens with respect to the benefi ts of 
technological progress” (Jasanoff  & Kim, 
2009: 120).
In 2006, ZEP released its fi rst set of 
research recommendations along with a 
“Vision Paper” outlining plans for emissions-
free power plants by 2020, facilitated by EU-
investments in CCS – a target which the then 
Commissioner for Science and Research 
Janez Potocnik stated would both stimulate 
and benefi t from European integration 
(ZEP, 2006b: 7). ZEP presented deployment 
of CCS as a necessary response to the need 
to maintain the EU’s energy supply after the 
EU enlargement of 2004, and argued that 
reliance on fossil fuels for energy generation 
was inevitable in anticipation of a transition 
to a “fully sustainable energy economy’ 
(ZEP, 2006b: 11-15). 
While founded as a research advisor 
to the EC, ZEP soon sought to establish 
itself as a public authority on CCS as well. 
However, the platform adopted a diff erent 
strategy to public engagement than the 
dialogue-focused approach that had 
characterized CCS advocacy in the US. 
Taking a decidedly defi cit model view of 
the dynamics of public engagement with 
technology, ZEP approached its audiences 
as passive recipients of information (Irwin 
& Wynne, 1996), and aligned itself with an 
often criticized tradition in EU bureaucracy 
of legitimizing technology with deference 
to expert judgments rather than civic 
deliberation (Felt et al., 2007; Hagendijk 
& Irwin, 2006; Sundqvist & Elam, 2010). 
Assumption about the public as consisting 
of a homogeneous pan-European audience 
is refl ected in information materials 
that ZEP distributes across EU member 
countries, which presents the technology as 
both essential and as safe and predictable 
when governed by EU legislation (ZEP, 
2009: 25). Th e emphasis appears to be on 
presenting technical facts about the safety 
of the technology and its ability to address 
EU-level environmental and energy policy 
goals, rather than on addressing the diverse 
implications CCS might have for diff erent 
groups of publics in the EU. 
In line with recommendations from ZEP, 
EU’s support mechanisms for CCS would 
eventually make public funding for the 
technology inseparable from broader aims 
of European integration. In 2005 the Union 
launched its Emissions Trading System – 
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the world’s fi rst market for greenhouse gas 
emission allowances, and similar to the 
regime which US legislators would come to 
reject in 2009. Th e system caps emissions 
based on the EU’s climate change targets, 
and allowances are traded on an internal 
European market. Th e main EU fi nancing 
instrument for CCS – NER300, which 
would stimulate the development of the 
aforementioned fl agship CCS demonstration 
programme – sought to subsidize CCS 
development through the sale of 300 million 
CO2 emission allowances, thus making 
EU-level support of CCS dependent on the 
success of the Union’s carbon market. And 
following the 2008 global fi nancial crisis, the 
establishment of the EU’s European Energy 
Programme for Recovery explicitly sought 
to allocate project support according to 
principles of European integration, and to 
take geographic distribution of funds across 
the Union, as well as distribution of funds 
between old and new member countries, 
into account alongside the evaluation of the 
technical merit of potential CCS projects.
As described above, the failure of US 
climate change legislation had led CCS 
proponents in environmental organizations 
and federal agencies to reformulate their 
narratives around CO2, representing it as a 
potentially valuable industrial commodity, 
rather than as a waste to be disposed of. 
Within the EU, the pursuit of CCS has led 
to parallel changes in the classifi cation of 
CO2, but within legal ontologies rather than 
in policy narratives. Th e EU’s commitment 
to international treaties for the protection of 
marine environments posed potential legal 
barriers to CO2 storage eff orts (de Coninck 
et al., 2007: 410). For instance, the 1992 
OSPAR Convention on the Protection of 
the Marine Environment of the North-East 
Atlantic prohibited polluting activities in the 
sub-seabed and subsoil. Th e Convention 
was amended in 2007 so as to allow sub-
seabed storage of CO2, and to rule out the 
defi nition of CO2 as “waste” under the 
convention (Purdy & Havercroft, 2007). In 
legal terms, the position of CO2 was shifted 
from unwanted waste to “non-waste” as 
part of broader eff orts to promote CCS. 
While the active facilitation of public 
engagement with CCS has been a priority 
for technology developers in the US, a lack 
of dialogue and trust between developers 
and communities has characterized high-
profi le controversies around CCS in EU 
member states  – most famously in the Dutch 
town of Barendrecht (Feenstra et al., 2010). 
In the comparative context of this article, 
one possible factor to consider here is how 
the aforementioned enrolment of private 
land owners as economic stakeholders in 
US CCS projects, is generally absent under 
European property regimes. In the EU, it is 
generally nation states rather than private 
landowners who control potential CO2 
storage sites (Wilson & Gibbons, 2007: 351). 
Where US law had stimulated new business 
models that off ered potential economic 
benefi ts to farmers and other landholders, 
some of the economic incentives that seem 
to have infl uenced community support for 
CCS projects in the US are absent within the 
EU. It seems plausible that this contrast has 
broader implications for the degree to which 
EU CCS advocates and developers consider 
it necessary to support public engagement 
eff orts in order to build support for the 
technology – something which might in 
turn illuminate the contrast between ZEP’s 
approach to public communication and 
that of its US counterparts. 
Conclusions: Structuring Visions
Th is article has sought to identify distinctive 
features of the engagement with CCS in the 
US and EU over the previous decade. I have 
looked at how political pursuits of CCS have 
taken form in relation to diff erent political 
commitments and priorities, and given rise 
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to new institutions and legal frameworks. 
Th ese factors show important diff erences 
between the two sites in terms of how CCS 
has become presented as a public good, 
and in terms of how diff erent publics have 
become implicated as stakeholders in the 
technology. My approach has sought to 
complement existing strands of research 
on the public perceptions and political 
motivations around CCS, by examining 
“instruments for the co-production of 
natural and social order” (Jasanoff , 2004: 
39-43) in the form of political narratives, 
regulatory frameworks and institutional 
formations and practices. Th e paper has 
taken an exploratory approach to unpack 
some of the “stakes behind the policies” 
of federal-level pursuits of emerging 
technologies, rather than to attempt to 
provide an exhaustive account of policy 
developments (Jasanoff  & Kim, 2009: 139). 
It has also sought to explore possible links 
between market and governance structures 
on one hand and the enrolment of publics 
as stakeholders on the other, rather than 
to take public attitudes to CCS as given or 
predefi ned in relation to abstract notions of 
what constitutes the risks and possibilities 
of the technology. Notably, legal ontological 
shifts have been illustrative in terms of 
signalling broader visions for CCS, as both 
political actors have reclassifi ed CO2 in 
order to justify the pursuit of CCS, rendering 
the substance governable either as property, 
waste, hazard or commodity, or sanitized 
“non-waste”. 
In the US, CCS has been pursued as an 
alternative to the Kyoto Protocol’s regulatory 
approach to greenhouse gas control, and 
presented as a technological measure more 
compatible with economic growth. Early 
institutional manifestations of this pursuit 
included multinational alliances initiated 
around CCS, which displayed US climate 
change eff orts to an international audience, 
while the technology was presented as 
protecting American jobs to domestic 
audiences. Th e interpretative fl exibility of 
CCS has thus supported political narratives 
that acknowledge the need to act on climate 
change, while at the same time abstaining 
from imposing regulation on the private 
sector, or interfering with the supply of 
cheap energy to its citizens. Th e emphasis 
on economic growth extended to the level 
of individual CCS projects as well, and 
local publics have been cast in the role 
of legitimate stakeholders motivated by 
interests in the benefi ts projects might bring 
to their communities. 
In the EU, CCS has been presented 
as a technology reconciling climate 
change mitigation commitments and 
energy needs, and put to the service of 
European integration. Political support 
for the technology has taken shape in 
coordination with the world’s fi rst major 
CO2 emissions trading scheme, which 
is internal to the EU and closely linked 
with aims of European integration. On 
the level of individual CCS projects, state 
ownership of underground space has cast 
local publics in a more passive role than in 
the US, and social mobilization around the 
technology has centred more on questions 
about local health and safety concerns, 
than on the potential for local economic 
growth. By facilitating the establishment 
of a single institution, a coalition of 
actors under the heading of a European 
Technology Platform, the European 
Commission ensured that CCS advocates 
would be required to present joint visions 
and recommendation for the technology, 
despite internal diff erences, if they were 
to have a formal and privileged position as 
a stakeholder forum. Some CCS-sceptical 
environmental organizations found it 
necessary to withdraw from the platform, 
even as this meant giving up the chance 
to infl uence European research priorities 
through a formalized process. Nevertheless, 
the continued participation of other 
environmental organizations as members 
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alongside industry representatives allowed 
the platform to lay claim to representational 
legitimacy alongside its epistemic authority 
on matters of technology development. 
In the US, land tenure appears to have 
been a “powerful [instrument] of meaning-
making” (Jasanoff  & Kim, 2009: 123-
124). Here, subsurface rights facilitated 
the enrolment of private landowners as 
economic stakeholders in CCS, as they stood 
to benefi t from the increasing value of lands 
suitable for CO2 storage. Along with these 
economic incentives, however, came a need 
for landowners to formulate and act on 
autonomous judgements about the stakes 
involved. Th is involved weighing questions 
about the potential risks and uncertainties 
about CO2 storage – the source of high-
profi le controversies around CCS in the EU 
– against the potential for profi t. Community 
engagement as practiced by companies 
like C12 Energy and by CCS advocates and 
project developers, thus served to provide 
publics with an epistemic basis on which 
to exercise presumed autonomy. In the 
EU, by contrast, member state control of 
the relevant subsurface use rights removed 
some of the economic incentives that had 
contributed to local support for CCS in the 
US. A tradition of expert authority operating 
with a conception of publics as passive 
recipients of science and technology, and 
the need for CCS proponents to respond 
to public controversies and fears about 
the safety of geological storage, appears to 
have fostered communication eff orts more 
concerned with sanitizing CCS, than with 
facilitating civic deliberation on it. 
Since the focus here has been on 
identifying possible links between patterns 
of public engagement and the various 
legislative mechanisms that aff ect the 
stakes of diff erent groups of publics in the 
development of CCS projects, it has been 
outside the scope of this article to assess 
whether the contrasting communication 
activities can be said to be “successful” in 
their respective contexts. However, further 
research on legal and other mechanisms 
aff ecting public responses to emerging 
technologies could be an important 
supplement to attitude surveys and focus 
group research. 
Delegation of agency to the private sector 
and deferrals to technological promise as 
a substitute for government control, has 
characterized the pursuit of CCS in the US. 
Even after the failure of policy measures 
designed to curb greenhouse gas emissions, 
CCS has continued to be portrayed as both 
environmentally responsible and consistent 
with economic growth, as support for 
the technology has become increasingly 
centred on the prospects for industrial 
utilization of CO2. Th ose who see enhanced 
oil recovery as either an end in itself, or as a 
stepping-stone for technology development 
facilitating CCS for climate change 
mitigation purposes, currently collaborate 
in the pursuit of industrial utilization of CO2. 
However, deep-seated diff erences between 
what diff erent groups see as the ultimate 
purpose of CCS in the US raises serious 
doubts about the permanence of their 
alliance. In the EU the choice of linking state 
fi nancial incentives for development of CCS 
to the EU’s system for trading greenhouse 
gas quotas, made the fate of the technology 
inseparable from the success of the pan-
European market for carbon allowances. 
Th e recent and dramatic devaluation of such 
allowances (Mahony, 2012) has reduced the 
incentives for industry to develop CCS. 
In both political settings, CCS has been 
pursued in accordance with distinct political 
and regulatory norms, and commitments 
to diff erent visions of the role of federal 
actors in protecting public interests. By 
examining how such features are built into 
publicly supported technological projects, 
we can hope to improve our understanding 
of how mobilization around universalized 
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conceptions of science and technology 
become situated within political contexts. 
While climate change mitigation currently 
appears to depend on international 
cooperation founded on a shared epistemic 
basis, it is important that mitigation options 
are not simply assessed as mere functions of 
economic projections, but that attention is 
also paid to assumptions about the societal 
implications of envisaged technological 
projects, and the potential disparity in how 
political actors formulate and pursue them.
Notes
1 Interviewees included representatives 
from the US Department of Energy, the 
Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum, 
the Natural Resources Defence Council, 
World Resources Institute, the European 
Commission, the Zero Emission Fossil 
Fuel Power Plants Technology Platform, 
the Bellona Foundation, the World Bank 
and the International Energy Agency. 
Echoing the approach of Dryzek and 
colleagues (2003), interviews were used 
as a way of pursuing theory-driven 
questions that were not necessarily 
addressed or elaborated on in offi  cial 
documents. Th us, informants were 
asked about the broader social, political 
and legal contexts that infl uenced the 
form and content of public support 
mechanisms for CCS in the US and EU, 
and how these conditions aff ected the 
work of their respective organizations. 
Th ey were also asked about how they 
perceived other actors’ motives, or 
perspectives towards CCS that contrasted 
with their own. Th e professional CCS 
community is relatively small (one 
informant referred to international CCS 
conferences as “family reunions”), and 
individuals often hold professional roles 
in several organizations concurrently. 
In order to encourage openness in 
interviews, the anonymity of informants 
is protected by referencing publicly 
available written sources whenever 
possible, and by restricting details about 
interviewee affi  liations. However, the 
explorative nature of the study makes it 
relevant to also include certain personal 
anecdotes and claims in the text.
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